Abstract. In the past few years, several new matching models have been proposed and studied that take into account complex distributional constraints. Relevant lines of work include (1) school choice with diversity constraints where students have (possibly overlapping) types and (2) hospital-doctor matching where various regional quotas are imposed. In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to transform an instance of (1) to an instance of (2) and we show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction. Our reduction provides a formal connection between two important strands of work on matching with distributional constraints. We then apply the reduction in two ways. Firstly, we show that it is NP-complete to check whether a feasible and stable outcome for (1) exists. Due to our reduction, these NP-completeness results carry over to setting (2). In view of this, we help unify some of the results that have been presented in the literature. Secondly, if we have positive results for (2), then we have corresponding results for (1). One key conclusion of our results is that further developments on axiomatic and algorithmic aspects of hospitaldoctor matching with regional quotas will result in corresponding results for school choice with diversity constraints.
Introduction
Real-life matching markets are often associated with various distributional constraints. In view of these constraints, there is a growing literature on matching markets that models and deals with such constraints. There are at least two distinct research directions in this growing literature.
The first one is school choice with diversity constraints, studied intensely in the controlled school choice problem, in which students have types such as race, gender, or socio-economic status. Each school is endowed with a lower and an upper quota for each distinct type. Such type-specific quotas are taken into account while determining the outcome. For example, a school may impose a target lower quota for accepting students from some disadvantaged group. The seeds for considering models where students may be of different types were already sown in the seminal paper on school choice [Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003] . Since the publication of the paper, there have been significant developments (2) they provide an efficient route to translate results from one model to another. In fact, one of the major success stories of matching markets has been the identification of general structure over the preferences of hospitals that guarantees the existence of stable matchings Milgrom, 2005, Hatfield and Kojima, 2008] . Contributions In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to transform an instance of (1) school choice with diversity constraints into an instance of (2) hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas. We show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction. Then we apply the reduction in two ways as described in Figure 1 . First, we study the complexity issues on computing a feasible and stable outcome. We prove that it is NP-complete to check the existence of feasible and stable outcomes for (1). Our reduction implies that these complexity results hold for (2) as well. In view of this, we help unify some of the results that have been presented in the literature. Second, if we have positive results, such as polynomial-time algorithms that guarantee the existence of some weakly stable outcomes for the model with regional quotas, then we have corresponding results for school choice with diversity constraints. One key conclusion of our results is that further developments on axiomatic and algorithmic aspects of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas will result in corresponding results in school choice with diversity constraints. In addition, we consider how to convert regional minimum quotas into regional maximum quotas and we show the difference between regional minimum quotas and regional maximum quotas.
Model

School choice
An instance I S of the basic school choice problem consists of a tuple (S, C, q C , X , ≻ S , ≻ C ).
There is a set of students S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n } and a set of schools C = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c m }. Each school c ∈ C has a capacity q c and let q C = (q c ) c∈C be a capacity vector consisting of all schools' capacities.
Each contract x = (s, c) is a student-school pair indicating that student s is matched with school c. Let X ⊆ S × C denote the set of available contracts. For any X ⊆ X , denote X s = {(s, c) ∈ X|c ∈ C} as the set of contracts involving student s and X c = {(s, c) ∈ X|s ∈ S} as the set of contracts involving school c in X.
Each student s has a strict preference ordering ≻ s over X s ∪ {(s, ∅)} where (s, ∅) denotes the option of being unmatched for student s. A contract (s, c) is acceptable to student s if (s, c) ≻ s (s, ∅) holds. The preference profile of all students is denoted by ≻ S = {≻ s1 , ..., ≻ sn }. Each school c has a strict priority ordering ≻ c over X c ∪ {(∅, c)}, where (∅, c) represents the option of leaving a seat vacant for school c. A contract (s, c) is acceptable to school c if (s, c) ≻ c (∅, c) holds. Let ≻ C = {≻ c1 , ..., ≻ cm } denote the priority profile of all schools. Given any two preference (or priority) orderings ≻ p and ≻ q , we say preference (or priority) ordering ≻ p is consistent with preference (or priority) ordering ≻ q if for any two contracts x, y, when x ≻ p y holds, it implies x ≻ q y.
An outcome (or a matching) X is a subset of X . Denote S c (X) = {s ∈ S|(s, c) ∈ X} as the set of students matched to school c and C s (X) = {c ∈ C|(s, c) ∈ X} as the set of schools matched to student s in the outcome X. An outcome X is feasible for I S if i) for each student s, |X s | ≤ 1, ii) for each school c, |X c | ≤ q c . A feasible outcome X is individually rational if each contract (s, c) ∈ X is acceptable to both student s and school c.
A mechanism φ is a function that takes an instance as input and returns a matching as an outcome. A mechanism φ is strategy-proof for students if any student s ∈ S cannot be admitted to a better school by misreporting his preference.
School choice with diversity constraints
An instance I D of school choice with diversity constraints is an extension of school choice problem, denoted by a tuple (S,C,q C ,T ,τ ,η,η, X ,≻ S ,≻ C ).
Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t k } be the type space with |T | ≤ |S|. A type vector τ s = (τ t s ) t∈T of student s consists of 1's and 0's such that τ t s = 1 if student s belongs to type t and τ t s = 0 otherwise. Let τ be the type matrix of all students' type vectors. Let η c = (η t c ) t∈T be a vector of school c's type-specific maximum quotas where η t c is school c's maximum quota for type t. Similarly, η c = (η t c ) t∈T is a vector of school c's type-specific minimum quotas. Let η and η be two matrices consisting of all schools' type-specific maximum vectors and minimum vectors respectively.
For any two vectors consisting of non-negative integers ω = (ω 1 , ..., ω k ) and
, we compare them in the following way:
i . An outcome X ⊆ X is feasible for I D with diversity constraints if it is feasible for I S and it respects diversity constraints, i.e., for each school c ∈ C, we have η c ≤ s∈Sc(X) τ s ≤ η c .
The following definition is a natural extension of classical stability concept by Roth [1985] to the setting of diversity constraints.
Definition 1 (Stability).
Given a feasible outcome X for instance I D with diversity constraints, a student s ∈ S and a school c ∈ C with (s, c) / ∈ X will form a blocking pair if (s, c) ≻ s X s and there exists a set of students
A feasible outcome X is stable if it is individually rational and it admits no blocking pair.
Definition 1 states that given a feasible outcome X, student s and school c will form a blocking pair if student s prefers school c to his current assignment X s (which could be empty if X s = (s, ∅)), and there exists a set of students S ′ (which could be empty) that are matched to school c in the outcome X such that i) each student s ′ ∈ S ′ has lower priority than student s and ii) school c could admit student s by (possibly) removing the set of students S ′ . We can decompose the blocking pair in Definition 1 into two cases: when the set of students S ′ is non-empty, we say student s has justified envy towards students S ′ and a feasible outcome X is fair if X admits no justified envy. If the set of students S ′ is empty, then we say the outcome X is wasteful. Alternatively, a feasible outcome X is stable if it is individually rational, fair and non-wasteful.
Hospital-doctor matching
An instance I
H of hospital-doctor matching is isomorphic to an instance I S of basic school choice problem, denoted by a tuple (D, Each doctor d has a strict preference ordering 
Hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas
An instance I R of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas is a tuple (D, H, R, q H , δ, δ, Y, ≻ D , ≻ H , ≻ R ) with additional entries R, δ, δ and ≻ R .
Let R = {r 1 , ..., r j } denote a set of regions where each region r i ∈ R is a subset of H, i.e., r i ⊆ H. A collection of regions P ⊆ R forms a partition of a subset of hospitals H ′ ⊆ H, if r∈P r = H ′ and for any two different regions r, r ′ ∈ P , we have r ∩ r ′ = ∅. A collection of regions F ⊆ R forms a hierarchy of hospitals H ′ ⊆ H, if r∈F r = H ′ and for any two regions r, r ′ ( = r) ∈ F , one of the three conditions holds: i) r ∩ r ′ = ∅, ii) r ⊆ r ′ , or iii) r ′ ⊆ r. Let δ = (δ r ) r∈R denote a vector consisting of each region's maximum quota where δ r is region r's maximum quota. Similarly δ = (δ r ) r∈R is a vector of each region's minimum quota.
For any Y ⊆ Y, let Y r = h∈r Y h be the set of contracts involving region r and let D r (Y ) = {d ∈ D|(d, h) ∈ Y r } denote the set of doctors matched to region r in the outcome Y .
The introduction of regional priorities was intended to resolve the conflicts when a region confronts more applicants of doctors than it could accommodate Kojima, 2017a, 2018] . 4 We followed this idea and assume that each region r has a strict priority ordering over Y r and a contract (
5 Let ≻ R denote the priority profile of all regions.
An outcome Y ⊆ Y is feasible for I R with regional quotas if Y is feasible for I H and it respects regional quotas, i.e., for any region r we have
The following stability concept captures the idea that a blocking pair is not considered as legitimate if it does not take regional priorities into account.
Definition 2 (Stability with regional priorities). Given a feasible outcome Y ⊆ Y for instance I R with regional quotas, a doctor d ∈ D and a hospital h ∈ H with (d, h) / ∈ Y form a blocking pair with regional priorities if
A feasible outcome Y is stable with regional priorities if it is individually rational and it admits no blocking pair with regional priorities.
Definition 2 states that given a feasible outcome Y , doctor d and hospital h will form a blocking pair if doctor d prefers hospital h to his assigned hospital H d (Y ) (which could be empty), and there exists a set of doctors D ′ (which could be empty) that are matched to hospital h in the outcome X such that i) each doctor d ′ ∈ D ′ has lower priority than doctor d, ii) for each region r that is associated with hospital h, each doctor d ′ ∈ D ′ has lower regional priority than doctor d and iii) hospital h could admit doctor d by (possibly) removing the set of doctors
The difference between Definition 1 and Definition 2 is that a blocking pair for an instance of matching with regional quotas should respect the priorities of both hospitals and regions. When distribution constraints do not exist, both definitions collapse to the original stability concept [Roth, 1985] .
We can decompose the blocking pair in the Definition 2 into two cases: when the set of doctors D ′ is non-empty, we say doctor d has justified envy towards D ′ with regional priorities and an outcome is fair with regional priorities if it admits no justified envy. When the set of doctors D ′ is empty, we say the outcome is wasteful.
Transformation from Diversity Constraints to Regional Quotas
In this section, we explore the relation between (1) school choice with diversity constraints and (2) hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas in terms of feasibility and stability. We show how to convert an instance of (1) into an instance of (2) in polynomial time and how the feasibility and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction. In a recent work, Kamada and Kojima [2017b] illustrate how to associate one instance of (1) with another of (2) when each student belongs to exactly one type. The idea is straightforward: Each student corresponds to a doctor and each school corresponds to a region. For each region, create multiple hospitals such that each hospital is associated with one type and each doctor only considers the hospital of the same type acceptable. However, we cannot directly extend this idea to the general case allowing for overlapping types. The main issue is that a doctor should not be assigned to several hospitals corresponding to the types to which he belongs.
The crux of the transformation is how to eliminate overlapping types among students. We can just create a new type space T = {t ′ 1 , ..., t ′ 2 |T | } such that each unique type vector τ s corresponds to a new type t ′ τs . It is not necessary to consider the whole type space T when 2 |T | is larger than |S|, because only the distinct type vectors that appear in type matrix τ matter, of which the maximum number is no more than min(|S|, 2 |T | ), bounded by the number of students |S|. Let T * be such a new type space induced from τ with |T * | ≤ min(|S|, 2 |T | ). Then we can assign a student s with type vector τ s one new type t ′ τs ∈ T * and no two students have overlapping types. Now we proceed to the polynomial-time reduction from an instance of diversity constraints The maximum and minimum regional quotas for each region are described in Table 1 . Let R = ci∈C R ci denote the set of regions with δ = (δ r ) r∈R and δ = (δ r ) r∈R . Example 1. We illustrate the reduction with the following example. Consider an instance I D with diversity constraints:
Create a corresponding instance I R with regional quotas as follows, where region r corresponds to school c, region r 1 corresponds to type t 1 and region r 2 corresponds to type t 2 at school c.
The relationship between two instances is shown in Figure 2 . The index of each hospital is in binary corresponding to each distinct type vector. Note that four copy schools {c 00 , c 01 , c 10 , c 11 } are used for interpretation only which are not actually involved in the reduction. Next we show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding outcomes are preserved under the reduction. Given an outcome X of instance I D with diversity constraints, create an outcome Y of induced instance I R with regional quotas by adding a corresponding contract y to Y for each contract x ∈ X. Proposition 3.2. The outcome X is feasible for I D with diversity constraints if and only if the induced outcome Y under the reduction is feasible for I R with regional quotas.
Proof. If outcome X is feasible for I D with diversity constraints, then for each school c ∈ C, we have |S c (X)| ≤ q c and η c ≤ s∈Sc(X) τ s ≤ η c . Since each school c i corresponds to a region r i , then no more than q ci doctors are matched to region r i in outcome Y , which implies that each hospital h τs ci ∈ r i admits no more than q ci doctors. Since each type j at school c i corresponds to a region r If outcome Y is feasible for I R with regional quotas, then for each region r we have δ r ≤ |D r (Y )| ≤ δ r . Since each region r i corresponds to a school c i , then no more q ci students are matched to c i in outcome X. Since each region r j i corresponds to one type j at school c i , then all type-specific quotas of school c i are satisfied in outcome X. Proposition 3.3. The outcome X is stable for instance I D with diversity constraints if and only if the induced outcome Y under the reduction is stable with regional priorities for instance I R with regional quotas.
Proof. If outcome X is stable, for the sake of contradiction, suppose outcome Y admits a blocking pair (d, h) with regional priorities induced from student s and school c respectively.
If outcome Y is stable with regional priorities, suppose outcome X admits a blocking pair (s, c) and let S ′ be the set of students such that each s ′ ∈ S ′ has lower priority than s at school c and school c could admit student s by removing S ′ . Let doctor d, region r and a set of doctors D ′ correspond to student s, school c and set S ′ of students respectively. Then doctor d and hospital h could form a blocking pair with regional priorities through a set of doctors D ′ , since all induced hospitals H c and regions R c from school c have the consistent priority orderings as school c, a contradiction.
4 Transformation from regional minimum quotas to regional maximum quotas
In this section, we further show how to transform an instance of regional maximum and minimum quotas into a corresponding instance of regional maximum quotas only in terms of feasibility. Goto et al. [2014 Goto et al. [ , 2016 considered how to represent regional minimum quotas with regional maximum quotas in a restrictive setting where any doctor is acceptable to any hospital and vice versa. In addition, the total capacity of all hospitals is at least the number of doctors and no doctors are unmatched in any feasible outcome. Their idea works as follows: If region r requires at least δ r doctors, then the number of doctors that can be assigned to other hospitals which do not belong to region r cannot exceed |D| − δ r . However, this does not hold in general if we relax these requirements.
Example 2. There are two doctors d 1 , d 2 , two hospitals h 1 , h 2 and two regions r 1 = {h 1 }, r 2 = {h 2 } with δ r1 = δ r2 = δ r1 = δ r2 = 1. Following the reduction of [Goto et al., 2014 [Goto et al., , 2016 , after removing regional minimum quotas, the regional quotas for the induced instance become δ r1 = δ r2 = 1. Then an empty outcome is feasible for the induced instance but not for the original one.
Next we generalize their idea to general setting without any assumption by adding an additional null hospital. Since we consider feasibility only, the preference and priority orderings of doctors, hospitals and regions are not necessary. Given a simplified instance of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas
, construct an instance with regional maximum quotas only Proof. If outcome Y respects regional quotas for I R , then for each r ∈ R, the number of doctors matched to H \ {r} does not exceed δr = |D ′ | − δ r , which implies the regionr respects regional quotas. If Y respects regional quotas for I R + , then for eachr ∈ R ′ , the number of doctors matched tor does not exceed δr = |D ′ | − δ r , which implies at least δ r doctors are matched with region r.
Our reduction reveals an important distinction between regional minimum quotas and regional maximum quotas: In an instance with regional maximum quotas only, any number of doctors can be placed at the null hospital without violating feasibility. But when we translate regional minimum quotas into regional maximum quotas, we limit the maximum number of doctors that can be matched to the null hospital by imposing regional caps to some regions that contain the null hospital.
Complexity results
This section is devoted to the complexity results on checking the existence of a feasible and stable outcome for both settings. We first prove NP-completeness for setting (1), then by reduction from setting (1) to setting (2), it implies that these NP-completeness results also hold for setting (2). In view of this, we help unify some complexity results that were already proved in previous literature, and we further show these NP-completeness results still hold under more restrictive settings.
Complexity of computing a feasible outcome
Next we provide a polynomial-time reduction from (3,3)-Set cover problem to school choice problem with diversity constraints. Gonzalez [1985] has proved that (3,3)-Set cover is NP-complete.
(3,3)-Set cover
Input:
A collection F of subsets of a finite set U and a positive integer k where each u ∈ U occurs in at most three subsets of F and each f ∈ F contains at most three elements of U . Question: Is there a subset F ′ ⊆ F of size at most k such that
Proposition 5.1. It is NP-complete to check the existence of a feasible outcome for school choice problem with diversity constraints, even if there is only one school, each student belongs to at most three types, each type contains at most three students and there is no upper bound for any type.
Proof. Given an instance I D with diversity constraints, to decide whether I D admits a feasible outcome or not is in NP, since we can guess an outcome X and check whether X satisfies feasibility in polynomial-time.
Given an instance (F, U ) of (3,3)-Set Cover, create a corresponding instance I D with diversity constraints as follows: For each element u i ∈ U , create a type t i . For each subset f j ∈ F , create a student s j . A student s j belongs to type t i if u i ∈ f j . Create one school c with capacity q c = k and minimum quota η t = 1 for each type t ∈ T . For each student s ∈ S, create a contract (s, c) which is acceptable to both s and c. Create an arbitrary priority ordering ≻ c .
If (F, U ) admits a Yes-instance F ′ of size at most k, then let S ′ = fj ∈F ′ s j denote the corresponding set of students. The outcome X = sj ∈S ′ (s j , c) is feasible for I D with diversity constraints, since school c admits at most k students and each minimum type-specific quota is satisfied.
If I D with diversity constraints admits a feasible outcome X, let F ′ = sj ∈Sc(X) f j denote the corresponding subsets of F . Then we have a Yes-instance of (3,3)-Set Cover, since we have |F ′ | ≤ k and f ∈F ′ f = U .
Although Goto et al. [2014] proved it is NP-complete to check the existence of feasible outcomes for setting (2), their original reduction requires both regional minimum quotas and regional maximum quotas (which needs to be equal for each region). Under the assumption that no doctor is unmatched in any feasible outcome (as discussed in last section), they infer that "checking whether a feasible matching exists or not is NP-complete where there are only regional minimum quotas or only regional maximum quotas". However, if we relax the assumption, it can be done in polynomial-time to check whether a feasible matching exists when there are only regional maximum quotas, since an empty matching satisfies feasibility. With the help of our reduction, we further show this NPcompleteness result even holds for a more restrictive setting when there are only minimum quotas in the following corollary:
Corollary 5.1. It is NP-complete to check the existence of a feasible outcome for hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas, even if each doctor is matched to at most three regions, each region admits at most three doctors and contains at most three hospitals, except for one region that contains all hospitals and is matched with all doctors.
In another recent work on public housing allocation with diversity constraints, Benabbou et al. [2018] showed that it is NP-complete to check whether there exists a feasible assignment with maximum social welfare, which is different from ours.
Complexity of computing a stable outcome
Now we move on to the complexity question of deciding the existence of a stable outcome. In previous work, Huang [2010] showed that it is NP-hard to compute a stable matching for school choice with diversity constraints when both minimum and maximum quotas exist. Next we show that if there are no minimum quotas, it is NP-complete to check whether a stable outcome exists under strict preferences. The following reduction is inspired by the work on hospital-doctor matching with couples by Ronn [1990] and McDermid and Manlove [2010] .
Proposition 5.2. Given an instance of school choice with diversity constraints in which there are no minimum quotas, it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a stable outcome under strict preferences, even if there are only two types, the capacity and type-specific maximum quotas for each school are at most 2 and the length of any preference / priority ordering is at most 4. Proof. First we prove that if there are no minimum quotas, deciding whether a stable outcome exists is in NP. We can guess an outcome X and check whether X admits a blocking pair in polynomial time as follows: For each student s and each school c such that (s, c) ≻ s X s , if school c can admit student s by removing all students who are matched to school c with lower priority than student s, then outcome X is not stable. This is because removing a set of students with lower priority than student s does not violate feasibility requirement.
Next we show it is NP-hard by reduction from a restricted version of 3-SAT where each literal appears exactly twice, which is NP-complete [Berman et al., 2003] . Given an instance (U, W ) of 3-SAT in which each literal appears exactly twice, let U = {u 1 , . . . , u k } denote a set of variables and W = {w 1 , . . . , w l } be a set of clauses. Create an instance I D with diversity constraints as follows. For each variable u i ∈ U , create a gadget consisting of 22 students and 18 schools as shown in Table 2 For each clause w j ∈ W , create exactly one school o j with capacity 2 and maximum quota 2 for two types. Let s(l 1 ) ≻ o j s(l 2 ) ≻ o j s(l 3 ) denote the priority ordering of school o j where s(l k ) denotes the corresponding student of literal l k that appears in clause w j .
Note that o(t In the previous version, we implicitly assume that there are no minimum quotas. student type vector preference s Lemma 5.1. If there exists a satisfying assignment α : U → {f alse, true} of instance (U, W ) of 3-SAT, then the induced instance I D of school choice admits a stable outcome.
Proof. For each gadget induced from variable u i , if the value of u i is true in the assignment α, then select the outcome X i T :
For the school o j induced from clause w j = (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ), if the value of literal l k is false in the assignment α, then match the student s(l k ) corresponding to literal l k to school o j . Next we show that none of induced schools would be part of any blocking pair. First consider any school o j induced from clause w j . Since the assignment α is satisfying, no more than two students will be matched to o j , otherwise corresponding clause is false. School o j would not be part of any blocking pair, since it can admit any two students without violating feasibility. Then consider the schools in the gadget induced by variable u i . If we select outcome X Lemma 5.4. For any stable outcome X for induced instance
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose (t respectively. However, outcome X is not stable, since students s Corollary 5.2. It is NP-complete to check whether there exists a stable outcome with regional priorities for hospital-doctor matching without regional minimum quotas, even if each region contains at most 4 hospitals, the capacity of each hospital and the maximum quota of each region is at most 2, and the length of any preference / priority ordering is at most 4.
Algorithm design for Weaker Stability
In this section we discuss the second implication of the reduction: how positive results for setting (2) hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas could lead to corresponding results for setting (1) school choice with diversity constraints. In general, stability with regional preferences is too strong to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes and it is NP-complete to decide whether one exists even if there are only regional maximum quotas.
Suppose there exists an algorithm φ that takes an instance I R with regional quotas as input and returns a feasible and weaker stable outcome with respect to priorities of hospitals and regions. Given an instance I D with diversity constraints, we can first convert I D into a corresponding instance I R with regional quotas in polynomial time. Then apply the algorithm φ designed for matching with regional quotas to instance I R to obtain some feasible and weaker stable outcome X R . By the corresponding relation, we can restore the outcome X R to an outcome X D of instance I D that also satisfies feasibility and some form of weaker stability. Now the problem boils down to designing a weaker stable concept for setting (2) which should be weak enough to guarantee the existence of feasible and stable outcomes but still strong enough to lead to reasonable outcomes. One possible way, which has been considered in the mechanism design of matching markets Fragiadakis et al. [2016] , Goto et al. [2016] , Kurata et al. [2017] , is to decompose stability into fairness and non-wastefulness, and then weaken one or both of them to obtain some weaker stable concept.
However, as far as we know, there is no convincing stability solution that works for a general instance of matching with regional quotas. Previous work mainly concentrates on special cases where regions form a partition or a hierarchy of hospitals, and they additionally assume there exists a strict master list over doctors that is used to determine which doctor should be matched when conflicts occur Goto et al. [2014 Goto et al. [ , 2015 Goto et al. [ , 2016 . Note that a master list is equivalent to imposing unified regional priorities on all regions. Based on such a strict master list over doctors, we can easily design a strategy-proof algorithm that always returns a feasible and stable outcome with regional priorities when there are only regional maximum quotas. For example, we can just employ serial dictatorship, which lets each doctor choose their favorite hospital without violating hospital capacity and regional maximum quotas in the order of master list, to obtain a stable outcome with regional priorities where regional priorities are consistent with master list Goto et al. [2014] , Fragiadakis et al. [2016] .
The following fairness concept for school choice with diversity constraints is a weaker version of fairness by considering master list. Compared to original fairness definition, it additionally requires that student s could have justified envy towards a non-empty set of students S ′ by master list if each student s ′ ∈ S ′ has lower master list priority than student s.
Definition 3 (Fairness by Master List).
Given an instance I D with diversity constraints, a feasible outcome X for I D and a strict master list ≻ ML , a student s has justified envy toward a non-empty set of students S ′ ⊆ S c (X) by master list, if the following conditions hold: i) (s, c) ≻ s (s, X s ), ii) for each s ′ ∈ S ′ , we have (s, c) ≻ c (s ′ , c) and (s, c) ≻ ML (s ′ , c) and iii) X ∪{(s, c)}\( s ′ ∈S ′ {(s ′ , c)}∪X s }) is a feasible outcome for I D . A feasible outcome X is fair by master list if X does not admit justified envy by master list.
Consider an instance I D of school choice without type-specific minimum quotas and a strict master list. If we apply serial dictatorship to its induced instance I R with regional quotas, then we obtain a feasible and stable outcome X R with regional priorities where each regional priority ordering is consistent with the master list. When we restore the outcome X R to outcome X D of the original instance I D , we have a feasible, non-wasteful and fairness outcome by master list. This serves well for the illustration of how positive results for setting (2) could lead to corresponding results for setting (1). Designing an appropriate stability concept for matching with regional quotas requires more exploration. One key conclusion of our results is that further developments on axiomatic and algorithmic aspects of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas will result in corresponding results in school choice with diversity constraints.
In this paper we provide a formal connection between two important forms of distributional constraints via a polynomial-time reduction. Our reduction has two implications: First, if we have NP-completeness results in the model of school choice with diversity constraints, then these complexity results also carry over to the model with regional quotas. Second, positive results, such as polynomial-time algorithms that guarantee the existence of some weakly stable outcomes for the model with regional quotas, imply corresponding results for school choice with diversity constraints.
Note that our reduction can be generalized to new models appearing in recent literature on school choice with diversity constraints. Matching with slot-specific priorities was proposed in [Kominers and Sönmez, 2016] where each slot (an extension of type) could have different priority orderings. This requires that the induced hospitals H i and regions R i should have different priority orderings from school c i . To overcome non-existence of feasible outcomes and improve efficiency, diversity constraints may be regarded as soft bounds and schools could admit more students than the type-specific quotas allows if some seats are unoccupied [Kojima, 2012 , Hafalir et al., 2013 , Ehlers et al., 2014 , Kurata et al., 2017 . This implies that in the induced instance, each doctor could have contracts with multiple hospitals at the same region. We can still convert an instance with these complicated diversity constraints into a corresponding instance with regional quotas, since the mapping relationship between two models does not change. Further development on matching with regional quotas will shed light on the problem of school choice with diversity constraints. Finally, it will be interesting to explore similar connections with other matching models (see e.g., [Aziz et al., 2018, Jones and Teytelboym, 2016] ).
